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Rachel Withers (2015) 
 
Why talk to artists? 
 
Before starting on this script, I mentioned to a new acquaintance, a fellow 
academic, that I’d been asked to write a short text on some aspect of artists 
and collaboration. I got a response that I wasn’t expecting. “Chanel and the 
Nazis, that kind of thing?” she asked. No, no, I gulped. My text needed to 
relate in some way to the widespread adoption of joint working practices or 
“distributed” authorship in contemporary art – with artists who explicitly work 
as couples or in teams or with specialists from other disciplines; or with 
“relational” projects that interpellate audiences as co-creators, and so on. 
Plus I’d need to flag at least some of the critical theories and arguments of 
the last fifty-odd years that have informed this tendency: the dismantling of 
notions of individual genius, the rejection of biographical criticism, the 
dethroning of authors as privileged interpreters of their own works, etcetera, 
etcetera. And somewhere in the mix, I’d probably also need to mention 
Roland Barthes’s still-influential 1967 essay, The Death of the Author, since 
that text has done so much to free artists from the punishing, restrictive 
aspects of discourses of individual authenticity and authorial consistency, 
and to accommodate them to the idea that meaning in art is contingent, 
unstable, generated through the social process.  
 
Confusion resolved, job done – but nevertheless, my new colleague’s instant 
identification of collaboration’s discreditable aspect unsettled me, because it 
needled lurking concerns of my own. I’d already decided to try and sketch 
some ideas about my own collaborations as a critic – research, writing, 
interviewing and conversations that I’ve been conducting, for a decade and 
more, with a number of artists in relation to their practices – and in regard to 
this I was niggling over a stricture laid down by New York Times co-chief art 
critic Roberta Smith in a Tate lecture in 20141. Critics (specifically, reviewers) 
should not talk to artists, Smith stated. In the context of her talk, her 
reasoning was clear. The prohibition had nothing to do with the theoretical 
turn away from humanist individualism, textual transparency and biographical 
critique sketched in the paragraph above (in fact, it ran against it – more on 
that later). It was straightforwardly about issues of independence and 
disinterest. Her implication was that hobnobbing with artists compromises 
one’s critical judgment and inhibits one’s scope to speak and write frankly. It 
could lead to dilute, toothless, congratulatory non-critique. At worst, it could 
smack of cronyism or financial motivation.  
 
Smith’s interdiction seems very steely and commonsensical, and it clearly 
works well for her. However, the art world would be an odd place if all critics 
followed it. One’s first thought is that it ascribes to critics a level of power 
and responsibility that few – maybe none – actually enjoy. These days, 
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critical coverage is largely a peripheral pursuit in relation to art world 
business; the time of the “make or break” review is long gone. Secondly, 
artist-critic dialogues proliferate in art writing; if the practice disappeared the 
field would be desperately impoverished. Thirdly, one can point to numerous 
sea-green-incorruptibles, critics doggedly opposed to the art market and its 
machinations, who nevertheless converse with and champion particular 
artists over the long term.  
 
One of the most prominent and interesting examples of this is the dialogue 
between Benjamin H D Buchloh and Gerhard Richter. The art-critical 
equivalent of tectonic plates grinding and grumbling against one another, the 
Richter–Buchloh conversation has been underway since the early 1970s, and 
at the time of writing, Buchloh is billed as working on a sole-authored 
monograph on Richter. In relation to this, Buchloh has gone public on his 
particular difficulties digesting the (in his words) “manifest conservatism” of 
Richter’s body of family pictures (Betty, 1988, the world-famous painting of 
Richter’s daughter, is just one example). Convinced a priori of the intrinsically 
anti-reactionary character of Richter’s overarching thought and practice, 
Buchloh constructs his critical task as one of explaining how Richter’s family 
pictures, despite their apparent conservatism, negotiate “the complexity of 
being a contemporary painter without relapsing into earlier models [of 
representational or expressivist painting] and resuscitating them as though 
they were valid”2.  
 
The Richter–Buchloh conversation is clearly of immense critical value, not 
least because it prompts obvious, productive questions. Most pressingly, 
what is Buchloh, the trenchant opponent of liberal-humanist-biographical – 
“oeuvre” – criticism doing, when he resorts to a framing of his research and 
tactics of argumentation that seem so clearly embedded in strongly oeuvre-
critical thinking? And given his critique of expressivism, how should we 
construe his foregrounding of the art-critically loaded terms “authenticity” 
and “honesty” in praising Richter? The point here, though, is not to twit 
Buchloh with inconsistency (to borrow C.D. Broad’s phrase), but to flag the 
sheer impossibility of thoroughgoing art-critical consistency. Why is it 
impossible? Not just because as embodied, time-bound, language-using 
social subjects we are all “in process”, but also because criticism’s 
readerliness must be acknowledged. Just like any other text, the critical text, 
an unreliable creative artifact, slips and slides.  
 
The language of critics is no more transparent than that of any other writer: 
another reason why Smith’s hypothetical, nobly impartial, disinterested, 
trustworthy critic who eschews hanging out with artists is arguably an 
impossible abstraction. A risky one too, since it doesn’t help encourage a 
questioning, creative, shrewd attitude to the reading of the critical text. As 
the saying goes, you shouldn’t believe everything you read in the papers. 
Here, I’m reminded of an intriguing seminar I conducted with a bunch of 
                                            
2 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FhTB5jVRV_o 
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young curators a few years ago, in which I presented pieces I’d written on 
the artist Susan Hiller, and referred to ideas exchanged in the many 
conversations she and I had engaged in over a long period. The postgrads 
were suspicious: this relationship must surely mean my writing on her work 
must be partial and compromised, they objected. And yet they were largely 
accepting of, and quite relaxed about, the general idea of the “death of the 
author” and the “play of the text” in relation to the artistic texts (visual, 
spoken, written) and the creative writing that they dealt with as aspiring 
curators. Caveat lector, I suggested; the ideas in Barthes’s axiomatic text are 
as applicable to critical writing as they are to other forms. The big surprise 
was how surprising the students found this. I suppose I was not exactly 
twitting them with inconsistency, but urging them to be consistent in their 
awareness and understanding of authorial instability and textual 
inconsistency. 
 
“That the author can only be conceived of as a manifestation of the Absolute 
Subject, this is the root message of every authocide. One must, at base, be 
deeply auteurist to call for the Death of the Author”, Sean Burke points out3. 
It’s a great clarification, and it has consequences for some of the principles 
fuelling the “collaborative turn” in contemporary art. As already noted, ideas 
derived from deconstruction – the rejection of bourgeois individualism, 
authenticity, the idea of linguistic or expressive mastery, and so on – are 
important touchstones for a good many collaborative practices. However, 
these deconstructive discourses have already, in advance, dismantled the 
self-contained, self-originating, protean subject some collaborative practices 
explicitly or implicitly aim to oppose. Even the most private-seeming, 
“individualistic” type of cultural practice is “always already” a decentred 
operation: a negotiation between present and past selves and internalized 
others, inconsistent and conflicting patterns of thought, multiple learned 
languages, cultural forms and idioms drawn from innumerable experiences 
and encounters, plus addresses aimed at hypothesized audiences of many 
kinds. In short, working on your own is (“always already”, as the saying goes) 
a weird process of collaboration: “Je est un autre” – I is someone else – in 
Rimbaud’s indispensable phrase.  
 
So, at the level of authorship, there seems to be contradiction built into the 
idea of collaborative art practice: either strongly or subtly, it needs to point 
towards a mythical Absolute Author in order to mark the distinctiveness of its 
own authorial operations. And this contradiction has a connection to the big, 
noisy, complicated argument that’s been underway over the last few years – 
over in the main hall, as it were – regarding art and the politics of 
collaboration. This discussion fixes on the apparent impossibility of 
reconciling the ideal of aesthetic autonomy with the demands of ethical 
practice: on “the contradiction that is created when art’s autonomous 
criticality is superimposed onto art as a socio-economic nexus of power” in 
Kim Charnley’s succinct summarization. The atmosphere generated by this 
                                            
3 Sean Burke, The Death and Return of the Author, Edinburgh University Press 1992, p. 27 
 4 
“savage and [apparently] irresolvable dialectical opposition”4 has reached 
such a high temperature that an art writer sticks her head round the door 
onto it at her peril. However, it seems worth asking if a shift of attention away 
from aesthesis and towards poiesis – away from the idea of art’s aesthetic 
effects and towards its poetical processes (its potential for the creation of 
new forms, new meanings) – might be of help, given that the philosophical 
construct of poiesis can be used to anchor the discussion of autonomy 
across every area of the institution of society, not just the aesthetic. Getting 
to grips with that involves continuing, energetic, foundational excavation of 
the whole idea of authorship, and talking to artists – reflectively, self-
reflexively, and without fear of the complexities and contradictions of those 
collaborative conversations – is clearly part of the critical process.   
 
 
                                            
4 Kim Charnley, Dissensus and the politics of collaborative practice, in Art and the Public 
Sphere vol.1 no1, 2011, p. 49 
